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PATENT REFORM ACT OF 2010: THE TIME FOR CHANGE IS NOW 
 
© 2011 Shivan Mehta 
 
 
I. The Patent Reform Act of 2010 
The Patent Reform Act of 2010 is a significant undertaking that will modernize 
the patent system by harmonizing American creativity and innovation with that of other 
developed countries.  Continuous pressure and valid attempts to reform the patent system 
have existed throughout the last decade; however, the Patent Reform Act of 2010 has 
presented the most advantageous changes to the current patent system. 
This note concentrates on details surrounding the major reformations present in 
the Patent Reform Act of 2010, which are expected to impact the American patent 
system.  Much controversy is associated with many of the reforms due to the varying 
effects the Act stands to generate as a result of its ratification.  Although the opinions of 
both the proponents and opponents of this Act are discussed, this note inherently 
appreciates and acknowledges the ultimate benefit the Reform Act of 2010 will render on 
the American technology market, i.e., synchronizing the processes for American 
creativity and innovation with those of developed countries and possibly stimulating 
essential innovations in the intellectual property realm. 
Part II of this note introduces patent reform by addressing the purpose underlying 
the modification process and detailing the development of patent law, which originated 
with the Patent Act of 1970.  Part III is divided into a total of nine sections, with each 
 2 
section devoted to a discussion of a pertinent component of the Patent Reform Act of 
2010.  Section A describes the patent application process and addresses the proposal of a 
first-to-file protocol.  Section B explains the adjustment to the amount of damages 
resulting from infringement under the reform.  Section C further comments on 
infringement damages, while chiefly focusing on willful infringement and the increased 
burden on the plaintiffs.  Section D discusses enhancement of reexamination procedures 
and post grant proceedings.  Section E details the pre-existing “best mode” standard and 
examines whether a possible reformation could provide relief to patent holders.  Section 
F entails a brief overview of claims and damages related to false marking.  Finally, 
sections G, H, and I extend the discussion of principle modifications under the Patent 
Reform Act of 2010 to minor reformations affecting litigation venue, fee setting 
authority, and patent law education within the district court system.  Part IV concludes 
this note. 
II. Historical Understanding of Patent Reform 
A. The Purpose of Patent Reform 
 The United States Constitution has protected inventions and designs in order to 
encourage creativity and innovation by giving Congress the power to “promote the 
[p]rogress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited [t]imes to Authors and 
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries….”
1
  The 
patent system was integrated into the U.S. Constitution by the founding fathers with the 
intention of safeguarding the intellectual property rights of the people.  Patent reform 
serves as an avenue through which the priorities of the American patent system can 
progress by “bolster[ing] economic development, sustain[ing] American innovation, and 
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  By placing a stronger emphasis on the first-to-file method, 
willful infringement, and reexamination through patent reform, the patent system will 
boost its objectives, as well as advance the technological innovation and creative abilities 
of the Nation.
3
  The efforts and effects of past patent reform acts pale in comparison to 
the Patent Reform Act of 2010 in furthering the inherent goals of patent reform.  
The objectives established by the Patent Reform Act of 2010 make innovative 
designs more visible without causing inventors to fear the loss of their patent rights.
4
  
Diverging substantially from past patent reform acts, the Patent Reform Act of 2010 
endeavors to harmonize the United States’ patent law system with those of the rest of the 
world by streamlining the patent process and reducing the potential for abuse of patent 
laws through unnecessary litigation.
5
  This goal of international harmonization through 
patent reform is a platform different from years past, thereby providing the Patent Reform 
Act of 2010 with a greater advantage for passage by Congress. 
B. The Chronology of Patent Reform 
 Since the 1700s, American patent law has endured significant changes due to 
economic developments within the country.
6
  In 1790, the Patent Act was introduced and 
it established a fourteen-year restriction on the length of patent terms.
7
  The Patent Act of 
1793 replaced the traditional registration system with an examination system, though the 
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 The Patent Reform Act: Securing American Innovation – Creating American Jobs, PATRICK LEAHY,  
http://leahy.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/041910PatentReformSupport.pdf (last visited June 29, 2011). 
3
  See Arti Rai, Stuart Graham & Mark Doms, Patent Reform: Unleashing Innovation, Promoting 
Economic Growth & Producing High-Paying Jobs, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE (Apr. 13, 2010), 
http://www.commerce.gov/sites/default/files/documents/migrated/Patent_Reform-paper.pdf.  
4
 Jonathan W. Parthum & Philippe J.C. Signore, Patent Reform: The Debate Continues into 2010, 2010 
PAT. L. ANN. 355, 358.  
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 See A Brief History of the Patent Law of the United States, LADAS & PARRY, 
http://ladas.com/Patents/USPatentHistory.html (last updated July 17, 2009).  
7
 See id.  
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original system was reintroduced in the Patent Act of 1836.
8
  Thirty-four years later, the 
Patent Act of 1870 expanded the initial fourteen-year patent term to seventeen years.
9
  
Not until the Patent Act of 1952, did Congress attempt to limit the scope of patentable 
subject matter by specifying the word “process,” and thus impart a document that would 
serve as the foundation for the current United States patent laws.
10
  
In the last decade, the first true attempt at an official patent reform occurred with 
the onset of congressional meetings in March 2001.
11
  However, patent reform then stood 
dormant for four years; substantial action did not take place again until 2005.  The Patent 
Reform Act of 2005 gained the support of many major corporations, and proposed the 
“first-to-file” method, a process already followed by the rest of the world.
12
  The Patent 
Reform Act of 2007 further developed the notion of progressing the United States’ patent 
laws towards a system similar to those of other countries.
13
  Both the 2007 and 2009 
Patent Reform Acts were unable to gain Senate support.  The Patent Reform Act of 2010 
seeks to resolve prior congressional disputes through amendments made to the Reform 
Act of 2009. 
14
  
If the Patent Reform Act of 2010 comes to fruition, it would be the largest patent 
system reformation in the last fifty years.
15
  American patent law has felt pressure to 
coordinate with the rest of the world in order to create international balance and diminish 
confusion.  The Obama administration strongly and openly believes these 2010 
amendments will greatly benefit American innovation, and thereby serves as a positive 
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 See id.  
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 See id. 
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 See id. 
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 See id. 
14
 See Parthum & Signore, supra note 4, at 360. 
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  After years of pressure to synchronize its patent law system 
with the systems used by the rest of the world, the United States may utilize the Patent 
Reform Act of 2010 as a leveling tool for dealing with foreign intellectual property.
17
 
III. Overview of Amendment S.515 (Patent Reform Act of 2010) 
 The Patent Reform Act of 2010 is more commonly referred to as Amendment S. 
515 (hereafter referred to as A.S. 515).  Of the many reformations A.S. 515 proposes, the 
most significant concerns are: (1) the first-to-file system and its effect on 35 U.S.C. § 
102(b) and § 102(g); (2) damage awards; (3) willful infringement; (4) reexamination and 
post grant proceedings; (5) best mode; (6) false marking; (7) litigation venue; (8) fee 
setting authority; and (9) patent education in the district courts. 
A. Which Inventors Should be Granted Patent Rights? 
 The “first-to-file” protocol is one of the most significant issues discussed in 
current patent reform since 2005.
18
  Under this system, the first inventor to (1) file his 
invention with any United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) and (2) gain 
patent approval by the USPTO, is granted full patent rights.
19
  First-to-file significantly 
differs from the “first-to-invent” system currently used by the United States.
20
  Under the 
first-to-invent system, the patent process is more time consuming because patent 
examiners must determine the identity of the first inventor through interference 
proceedings, a requirement that does not exist in the first-to-file system.
21
  Until now, the 
United States has refused to switch systems, although A.S. 515’s endorsement of the 
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 See Parthum & Signore, supra note 4, at 374. 
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 See id. 
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first-to-file procedure could provide many indispensable modifications to the current U.S. 
patent system. 
1. The Effect on § 102(g) Priority Date 
Under the present first-to-invent system, patent examiners have the burden of 
determining the origin of an innovation through interference proceedings.
22
  The Manual 
of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP) defines interference proceedings as occurring 
when an inventor claims his invention preceded that of another’s, resulting in the need for 
an examiner to analyze each claim, along with any extrinsic evidence, in order to 
determine “dates of conception and reduction to practice” per conditions of 35 U.S.C. § 
102(g).
23
  Although 35 U.S.C. § 135 governs the majority of interference proceedings, § 
102(g) places a standard of reasonable diligence on inventors who were “first to conceive 
and last to reduce to practice ….”
24
  According to USPTO director David Kappos, 
interference proceedings occur only .01% of the time; as a result, he feels “we already 
essentially have a first inventor to file system.”
25
  Therefore, the transition to a first-to-
file system should not create many additional difficulties and would result in the 
elimination of all interference proceedings, consequently eliminating the arduous task of 
determining 102(g) priority dates of claims.  
 
 
                                                        
22
 Michael F. Martin, Article, The End of the First-to-Invent Rule: A Concise History of its Origin, 49 
IDEA 435, 467 (2009).  
23
 See Manuel of Patent Examining Procedure: § 2301.03 Interfering Subject Matter, U.S. PAT. & 
TRADEMARK OFFICE, 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/documents/2300_2301_03.htm#sec2301.03 (last modified 
Dec. 18, 2008); 35 U.S.C.A. § 102(g) (West 1999). 
24
 35 U.S.C.A. § 102(g) (West 1999); 35 U.S.C.A. § 135 (West 1999).   
25
 Vincent LoTempio, “Patent Reform Act of 2010” and “First Inventor to File” Rule Change, LOTEMPIO 
L. BLOG (Mar. 22, 2010), http://www.lotempiolaw.com/2010/03/articles/patents/patent-reform-act-of-2010-
and-first-inventor-to-file-rule-change/. 
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2. The Effect on 102(b) Statutory Bar 
Under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b), grace periods are allotted to inventors that allows them 
to publically disclose their inventions one year prior to the earliest filing date.
26
  If the 
inventors fail to file within one year from their disclosure, all patent rights are lost.
27
  A 
transfer to the first-to-file method, under A.S. 515, would eliminate “the one-year grace 
period unless the inventor was the ‘first discloser’.”
28
  Inventors are the “first disclosers” 
if they file an application first with any patent office.
29
  Under A.S. 515, there is no 
longer a need for this time limitation.  By permitting inventors to file their invention in 
any patent office, the need for a grace period is obsolete.  Foreign inventors would 
greatly benefit by no longer being held to separate standards when filing for a patent 
within the United States.  
3. Proponents and Opponents of the First-to-File System 
 Foreign and domestic corporations, like Bose, ExxonMobil, and Microsoft, are 
major proponents of the first-to-file system because reformation will help streamline the 
“international harmonization” of the patent process, in addition to also mitigating issues 
stemming from dissimilarities in the systems of the U.S. and surrounding countries.
30
  
Collectively, these companies want the U.S. to accommodate their interests in the patent 
system reform in order to help them avoid international adversity.  The first-to-file 
                                                        
26




 Dennis Crouch, Patent Reform Act of 2010: An Overview, PAT. L. BLOG (Mar. 8, 2010), 
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2010/03/patent-reform-act-of-2010-an-overview.html. 
29
 See ROGER WILLIAM ET AL., THE LAW AND PRACTICE RELATING TO LETTERS PATENT FOR INVENTIONS 37 
(William Clowes & Sons, Ltd. 1900). 
30
 See Crouch, supra note 28. 
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system replaces interference proceedings with accurate derivation proceedings, ensuring 
respective inventors are first to file, a major benefit to these large corporations.
31
 
A majority of the opponents to the first-to-file system are “independent inventors, 
small businesses, and universities.”
32
  These entities argue that larger companies have 
greater resources, both financially and technologically, and thus possess a clear 
advantage in the race to file at any patent office.
33
  The variance in the amount of 
resources makes it difficult for smaller companies to compete in the marketplace.
34
  As a 
result, they are wary of elimination of the current one-year grace period provided under 
the first-to-invent system.  
4. Overall Significance of First-to-File 
While possible that independent inventors and smaller companies may have fewer 
resources than larger corporations, such individuals and small entities gain an advantage 
in the first-to-file system with “provisional filing.”  Independent inventors can file a 
provisional patent application within one year of completing their designs.
35
  Such 
applications provide inventors with a simplified method by which to acquire an earlier 
filing date with relative ease, thus reducing the potential disadvantages resulting from the 
loss of the one-year grace period.
36
  Aside from mitigating any advantageous gains 
experienced by larger corporations, the first-to-file method also benefits the U.S. patent 
system by unifying the American innovative market with that of the rest of the world. 
                                                        
31
 First-to-File vs. First-to-Invent: Who Really Benefits from Changing the U.S. Patent System?, GEN. 
PATENT CORP., http://www.generalpatent.com/first-file-vs-first-invent-who-really-benefits-changing-u-s-
patent-system (last visited Apr. 20, 2011).  
32
 Parthum & Signore, supra note 4, at 375. 
33
 Michael A. Glenn, Article, Article I and the First Inventor to File: Patent Reform or Doublespeak?, 59 




 Vito J. DeBari, International Harmonization of Patent Law: A Proposed Solution to the United States’ 
First-to-File Debate, 16 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 687, 713 (1993). 
36
 Id. at 711. 
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Countries such as India and China are prospering through innovation, and their success 
illustrates how an internationally harmonized patent system would ultimately benefit the 
United States.  
B. How Should Damages be Proven?  
 Immersed within A.S. 515 is a damages clause that requires courts to “identify the 
methodologies and factors that are relevant to the determination of damages, and … 
consider only those methodologies and factors relevant to making such determination.”
37
  
The proposed statute also increases the responsibility among parties by maintaining that 
every party must “state, in writing and with particularity, the methodologies and factors 
the parties propose for instruction to the jury in determining damages … specifying the 
relevant underlying legal and factual bases for their assertions.”
38
  Moreover, the 
amendment adheres to a stricter standard than the current damages section in the Patent 
Reform Act of 2009 by requiring “the court [to] award the claimant damages adequate to 
compensate for the infringement….”
39
  By instilling a stricter analysis requirement before 
awarding damages, A.S. 515 reduces the opportunity for plaintiffs to take advantage of 
jury sympathies and the lax damages standards found in the 2009 Reform Act. 
Only when a party lacks “evidentiary basis” is a jury allowed to consider the 
specific methodologies brought by each party and grant “summary judgment on 
damages” under A.S. 515.
40
  By compelling an analysis that meets the “methodologies 
and factors” criteria, courts are forced to assume the role of gatekeeper, with duties that 
involve protecting parties from excessive damages without specifically limiting damages 
                                                        
37
 S. 515, 111th Cong. § 4(b) (2009). 
38
 Id. § 4(b)(2). 
39
 35 U.S.C.A. § 284 (West 2000). 
40
 Crouch, supra note 28. 
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for the infringed parties.
41
  As gatekeeper, courts have flexibility in choosing methods for 
determining reasonable royalty damages in patent infringement suits.
42
  Unlike the 2009 
Reform Act, which attempted to reform the court’s role in proper damage determination, 
A.S. 515 uses a “methodologies and factors” criteria in conjunction with the factors set 
out in Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United States Plywood Corp.
43
 in order to provide a more 
thorough analysis.
44
  The fifteen Georgia-Pacific factors include: 
[1] Royalties patentee receives for licensing the patent in suit; [2] Rates licensee 
pays for use of other comparable to the patent in suit… [4] Licensor’s established 
policy and marketing program to maintain patent monopoly by not 
licensing others to use the invention; [5] Commercial relationship between 
licensor and licensee, such as whether they are competitors or inventor and 
promoter…[7] Duration of patent and term of license; [8] Established profitability 
of the products made under the patent, its commercial success and its current 
popularity; [9] Utility and advantages of patent property over old modes and 
devices… [11] The extent to which the infringer has made use of the invention 
and the value of such use; [12] The portion of profit or selling price customarily 




The adjustments to the damages section of the 2009 Reform Act are likely to gain 
support during congressional hearings due to the addition of the “methodologies and 
factors” requirement.  This section is expected to result in swift and harsh punishment 
that is not excessive or unfair.  The heightened standard is beneficial to all parties and 
restructures a damage and royalty calculation system that currently proves to be difficult 
in a “dynamic marketplace.”
46
  The enhanced role of courts ensures fairness and 
uniformity among damage awards, and provides an increasingly clear picture of the 
standard required of parties in a case.   
                                                        
41
 See Albainy-Jenei, supra note 5. 
42
 35 U.S.C.A. § 284. 
43
 See Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United States Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). 
44
 See Parthum & Signore, supra note 4, at 362. 
45
 Georgia-Pacific Factors for Determining Reasonable Royalty, SUNSTEINLAW, 
http://www.sunsteinlaw.com/media/Georgia-Pacific.pdf (last visited May 30, 2011). 
46
 See Parthum & Signore, supra note 4, at 362. 
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C. Willful Infringement 
 Under the current patent law system, “the court may increase the damages up to 
three times the amount found or assessed” when willful infringement is found.
47
  A.S. 
515 proposes a specific definition for the term “willful.”  By assigning a concrete 
meaning to this word, the present requirement that a court require proof of “objective 
reasonableness” by the infringer becomes obsolete and a more stringent standard takes its 
place.
48
  The reform states that to be “willful” a party must be found “objectively 
reckless” by “clear and convincing evidence.”
49
  Possible proof of “objective recklessness 
[would exist] if the infringer was acting despite an objectively high likelihood that his 
actions constituted infringement of a valid patent….”
50
  A verdict of willful infringement 
is not solely based on the infringer’s particular “knowledge of the infringed patent.”
51
  
Instead, the plaintiff has a burden to prove more than “knowledge alone” to have a viable 
willful infringement claim; therefore, more specific and articulate facts will be required, 




 Proponents of willful infringement reform believe the transition will not be 
difficult, primarily because the current patent law system already uses “clear and 
convincing evidence.”
53
  The heightened burden of proof placed upon infringed parties 
eases the probability that a defendant will be charged for willful infringement, and thus 
                                                        
47
 35 U.S.C.A. § 284.  
48
 See In re Seagate Technology, 497 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
49




 Id. § 4(d)(3).  
52
 Crouch, supra note 28. 
53
 In re Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1371.  
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face high penalty damages.
54
  Such proponents also believe there will be less of an 
incentive to file “time-consuming willfulness claims” due to the higher burden, therefore 




 Reform opponents, on the other hand, contend that it is already too difficult under 
the current system of “objective reasonableness” for infringed parties to claim damages 
when “willful infringement” has occurred.
56
  Further, a heightened standard, as proposed 




A higher burden of proof is seemingly appropriate for willful infringement cases 
due to the time-constraints faced by courts with presumably large dockets.  Society could 
benefit by a reduction in the amount of litigation of burdensome and repetitive 
willfulness claims brought by desperate patent holders.  With this reform, petty willful 
infringement claims are likely to become extinct, and thus release some of the strain on 
the resources of the court.  
D. Opportunities to Correct an Issued Patent 
1. Reexamination Process 
The USPTO uses a procedure called “reexamination” to correct an already issued 
patent, when new evidence is presented concerning third party claims to the patent.
58
   
                                                        
54
 See David R. Clonts, The Federal Circuit Puts the Willfulness Back Into Willful Infringement, INTELL. 
PROP. & TECH. L.J., Dec. 2007, at 9, 12.  
55
 Christopher Lanks, In re Seagate: Effects and Future Development of Willful Patent Infringement, 111 
W. VA. L. REV. 607, 633 (2009). 
56
 See Parthum & Signore, supra note 4, at 366. 
57
 See Clonts, supra note 54, at 637. 
58
 See Robert J. Yarbrough, Patent Reexamination, YARBROUGH LAW, 
http://yarbroughlaw.com/Publications/pubs%20patent3%20Patent%20Reexamination.htm (last visited Feb. 
23, 2011). 
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The reexamination process has been a steady and reliable tool in lieu of patent litigation, 
which can be costly and time consuming.
59
  The patent holder benefits from the 
reexamination process because it provides an opportunity to narrow the claims of their 




There are two types of reexamination proceedings, ex parte and inter partes.  Ex 
parte proceedings arise when the USPTO determines there is a “substantial new question 
of patentability.”
61
  Any person may file for a reexamination proceeding during the 
enforceability period of the patent, though they are not allowed to be present at the 
reexamination proceeding.
62
  The reexamination process proved significant during 
proceedings in NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd. Research in Motion (RIM) found 
prior art, which it used to invalidate NTP’s patents.
63
  The USPTO examined thousands 
of pages that had been turned in by both RIM and NTP through reexamination 
proceedings, and eventually rejected two of NTP’s patents.
64
 
Inter partes proceedings are similar to ex parte proceedings in that they both entail 
a USPTO determination of the presence of a “substantial question of patentability.”
65
  A 
crucial difference is that a third party requester can participate in the inter partes 
examination proceedings upon the condition that the patent “application was filed on or 
                                                        
59
 Parthum & Signore, supra note 4, at 368. 
60
 See Yarbrough, supra note 58. 
61
 35 U.S.C.A. § 303(a) (West 2002). 
62
 Manuel of Patent Examining Procedure: § 2209 Ex Parte Reexamination, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK 
OFFICE, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mprep/documents/2200_2209.htm#sect2209 (last modified 
Dec. 18, 2008). 
63
 See NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 397 F. Supp. 2d 785 (E.D. Va 2005). 
64
 See id.   
65
 35 U.S.C.A § 313 (West 2002). 
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after November 29, 1999 ….”
66
  Although third party requesters may partake in the 
proceedings, they are estopped from later asserting that a claim is invalid based on 
assertions that were raised or “could have [been] raised” at the proceeding.
67
    
A.S. 515 focuses on inter partes proceedings by paying close attention to removal 
of the language “could have been raised” from the statute.
68
  The elimination of this 
phrase serves to provide a third party requester with protection from the estoppel effect 
discussed above.  In addition to the language amendment, A.S. 515 also proposes that an 
administrative patent judge be required to preside over all ex parte and inter partes 
hearings.
69
  In effect, a judge of this nature possesses more knowledge of the patent 
application, as well as the patent process as a whole.
70
  
2. Post-Grant Review Process 
Under the new reform, a process akin to the reexamination proceeding is 
introduced; it is called “post-grant review.”
71
  The post-grant review replaces litigation by 
allowing third parties to challenge a patent after issuance.
72
  During the post-grant 
process, the USPTO reviews the basis of whether one or more claims of a patent are 
invalid.”
73
  Unlike reexamination, post-grant review is only available nine months after a 
patent has been issued.
74
  Also, this type of evaluation is handled directly by the patent 
                                                        
66
 Manuel of Patent Examining Procedure: § 2609 Optional Inter Partes Reexamination, U.S. PAT & 
TRADEMARK OFFICE, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/documents/2600_2609.htm#sect2609 
(last modified Dec. 18, 2008).  
67
 Parthum & Signore, supra note 4, at 368. 
68
 S. 515, 111th Cong. § 5(a) (2009). 
69
 See id. 
70
 Id. § 6(b). 
71






 Id. § 5(c). 
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appeals board, and a “supplemental examination” ensures that the patent holder has 
completed his “duty of disclosure.”
75
    
Generally, a post-grant review can supplement the reexamination process, though 
A.S. 515 permits post-grant review to replace reexamination when there is “a showing 
that the petition raises a novel or unsettled legal question.”
76
  Extending the use of the 
post-grant review is likely to be beneficial to all those involved.  Apprehensions 
associated with reexamination, such as its time consuming nature and inability to 
consistently avoid litigation, are of no substantial concern with post-grant reviews.  
Moreover, the post-grant review process is “not limited to patents and printed 
publications” like the reexamination proceeding.
77
  Overall, the post-grant review process 
can have a “dampening effect on aggressive patent portfolio strategies” and provide 
further fundamental patent review.
78
 
3. Proponents and Opponents of Reexamination and Post-Grant 
Although both the advocates and the opponents of A.S. 515 have their qualms, 
there remains little conflict between the groups regarding the reexamination and post-
grant review processes.  A few individuals fear an increase in post-grant reviews will 
slow an inefficient patent review process; however, it can be countered that a three panel 
judging board could “enhance the process’s reliability.”
79
  Conversely, some individuals 
maintain that a lower standard of reexamination will result in an increase of post-grant 
                                                        
75
 Crouch, supra note 28. 
76
 S. 515, § 5(b). 
77
 Parthum & Signore, supra note 4, at 370. 
78
 Bronwyn H. Hall, Post-Grant Patent Review, BERKELEY (Apr. 16, 2004), 
https://elsa.berkeley.edu/~bhhall/papers/BHH04_BCLT%20handout.pdf. 
79
 Stephen G. Kunun, Article, The Metamorphis of Inter Partes Reexamination, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
971, 988 (2004). 
 16 
reviews that invalidate “only bad patents;” therefore, ascertaining that a post-grant review 
process will allow for a quicker and cheaper system, while maintaining accuracy.
80
   
Overall, the “could have been raised” estoppel effect has hindered many third 
parties from adequately challenging the validity of a patent.
81
  Thus, the reformation will 
reduce the estoppel’s effect, resulting in an increased quality of future patent applications 
and a curtailment of the lengthy review process.  Overall, the inter partes reexamination 
and post-grant process should be more beneficial than detrimental to the patent process. 
E. Is Best Mode a Necessary Requirement? 
 Under the current patent statute, an inventor is required to disclose the method, or 
best way, “of carrying out [the] invention.”
82
  If this condition is ignored, an inventor 
would likely lose in litigation due to the insufficiency of fulfilling this requirement, 
regardless of the merits behind the claim.
83
  This rigid obligation is an elevated issue in 
the current best mode system.  Although the best mode requirement aspires to improve 
the quality of disclosure by allowing the public to recognize the societal need for an 
invention, its unduly subjective standard results in both time and money being wasted on 
the search for information that could show an inventor concealed evidence, and therefore 
knew of the particular best mode at the time of filing his or her application.
84
  A.S. 515 
appears to support the best mode requirement; aside from eliminating the invalidation 
clause, which terminates a patent during litigation upon noncompliance with the best 
                                                        
80
 Matthew Sag, Article, Patent Reform and Differential Impact, 8 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 1, 95 (2007).  
81
 See Parthum & Signore, supra note 4, at 368. 
82




 See Vincent LoTempio, “Patent Reform Act of 2010” and Best Mode Requirement, LOTEMPIO L. BLOG 
(Apr. 3, 2010), http://www.lotempiolaw.com/2010/04/articles/patents/patent-reform-act-of-2010a-and-best-
mode-requirement/. 
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 Proponents of the amendment believe the best mode requirement is an 
unnecessary distraction during litigation, because it precludes the court from focusing on 
the merits of the patent application.
86
  They believe that by removing the best mode from 
litigation, it will forestall the loss of exceptional patents in the future, an issue many 
patents have met due to the hierarchy of the best mode requirement over the specific 
claims aligned with the patent application itself. 
87
 
 On the other hand, opponents of the reform reason that the public needs to be 
informed of the best method used by the inventor in order to foster innovation and 
creativity.
88
  They maintain that if this requirement is removed, patent applicants will 
withhold important technical pieces of their invention from the public, resulting in quick, 
though possibly inept, litigation.
89
 
 By and large, patent invalidation due to failure to meet best mode requirements 
seems unnecessary and is an effortless conduit for removal of an exceptional patent by a 
challenging party with no substantial consideration allotted to the merits.  Procedural 
issues should not serve as a shortcut in which to disclaim a patent.  Instead, courts and the 
USPTO should base all patent applications on the merits of the application itself.  The 
current patent act grants third party challengers the ability to needlessly burden the patent 
holders, and in turn, stifles innovation and creativity.  A.S. 515 is capable of reversing 
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this effect by providing a way for patent holders to reclaim their inventions and the 
public, their creativity.  
F. Public Deception Through False Marking of Products 
 The false marking statute allows “any person” to file a false marking claim, even 
if damages are minimal or non-existent.
90
  The false marking statute intends to deter 
public deception through false marks on unpatented products that falsely indicate that the 
product has been patented or has a patent pending.
91
  Although the false marking statute 
operates to protect the public and promote competition, it still remains the center of much 
debate.
92
   
In Forest Group, Inc. v. Bon Tool Company, the Federal circuit held that “a fine 
of ‘not more than $500’” may be awarded to an infringed party on a per article basis, 
instead of a traditional award of single damages per violation.
93
  The court’s ruling 
resulted in an increase of litigation pertaining to false marking statute violations.
94
  Due 
to the per article damage analysis, the possibility for copious penalties increased, causing 
plaintiffs to strive to take advantage of the subsequently generous damage awards.
95
 
 Under A.S. 515, an individual must have “suffered a competitive injury as a result 
of a violation of [the] section…” in order to meet the standing requirement needed to file 
a false marking claim.
96
  This amendment is substantial in comparison to the “any 
person” standard required under current patent law.
97
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 Those in favor of narrowing the class of people eligible to sue argue that 
increasing the burden of potential infringed patent holders will benefit the court system 
by forestalling much of the litigation that arises as a result of the Forest Group holding.
98
  
Thus, the false marking statute accomplishes the significant goals of reducing patent 
litigation and controversy. 
 In opposition to the reform of the false marking statute are those who feel the 
amendments portray ambiguous language which creates an excessive burden on the 
plaintiff to prove “competitive injury.”
99
  Such uncertainty has many individuals worried 
about the costs that will arise as a result of this heightened standard.
100
 
 It seems apparent that the courts will benefit greatly by a reduction of false 
marking litigation due to an increased burden upon the plaintiff to prove that he or she 
sustained a “competitive injury.”  Although it might initially be difficult to define 
“competitive injury,” court precedent will eventually establish its limits and boundaries.  
The increased burden will reduce unnecessary litigation and prevent defendants from 
having to pay heinous damages in false marking suits. 
G. Where Should Patent Litigation Reside? 
 The objective of “venue statutes is to protect defendants from the inconvenience 
of having to defend … [themselves] in a trial court that” may be prejudicial or 
controversial.
101
  Currently, venue in patent infringement suits may be brought either (a) 
“where the defendant resides;” or (b) “where the defendant has committed acts … and 
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has a regular and established place of business.”
102
  Historically, jurisdiction has proven 
to be an issue for many corporations as they are subject to personal jurisdiction in many 
states.  A.S. 515 allows transfer of venue only “upon a showing that the transferee venue 
is clearly more convenient than the venue in which the civil action is pending.”
103
  
Proponents of this transfer of venue reform tend to be larger corporations that 
have significant concerns regarding “forum shopping by smaller companies,” as well as 
plaintiffs who take advantage of the lax venue requirements that are currently in use.
104
  
These advocates are seemingly satisfied with this amendment, because although the 




 Of course, the opponents of this additional venue option are smaller corporations 
who want the added advantage over corporations with deep pockets.
106
  Additionally, 
there is an underlying belief that the preferable, or most appropriate, venue will not be 
chosen because a limited number of courts in the nation have the “expertise and 
timeliness” to handle patent infringement cases.
107
  Therefore, these individuals further 
believe that unfamiliar courts will handle a greater number of patent infringement cases, 
possibly resulting in an adverse effect on the purpose and policy of intellectual property 
law.
108
  As a solution, some argue that there should only be one major appellate court, the 
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Federal Circuit, that handles all appellate decisions in order to reduce any advantages that 
forum shopping may offer.
109
  
 Ultimately, there should be benefits available for large corporations which are 
heavily involved in litigation.  The amendment provides such relief by disabling smaller 
parties from taking advantage of forum shopping tactics.  Congress has been under the 
heavy influence of these larger corporations to pass this bill, thus even if only a portion of 
A.S. 515 is passed, the venue reformation has significant support and is likely to be a 
viable contender. 
H. Who Sets Proper Filing Fees? 
 Currently, the USPTO does not have complete rulemaking authority to set fees 
during the patent process.
110
  There are many areas of fee setting that are left to Congress 
and the judiciary, primarily to prevent the USPTO from developing a monopoly over the 
patent process.
111
  A.S. 515 states that, “The Director shall have authority to set or adjust 
by rule any fee established or charged by the Office…[provided that] fee amounts are in 
the aggregate set to recover the estimated cost to the Office for processing, activities, 
services and materials relating to patents and trademarks, respectively….”
112
  The 
language suggests that the purpose of the reformation is to provide the USPTO with 
proper authority to adjust any regulatory fees, though congruently safeguard against the 
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 Members of USPTO favor this revision because providing the USPTO with fee-
setting authority could help the USPTO set up an intelligent and thorough financial plan 
for the future.
114
  USPTO Director David Kappos has stated that the Office plans to 
receive “between $146 and $232 million more than its appropriated amount in FY 
2010.”
115
  This money could be used to benefit the USPTO by providing resources to 
help improve patent efficiency.
116
 
 Currently, the main opponents of this reform are members of the American 
Intellectual Property Law Association (AIPLA) who believe that Congress needs to 
ensure that fees paid by inventors will be used specifically to process patent applications, 
instead of used to fund other ambiguous needs established by the USPTO.
117
  In addition 
to AIPLA, there are many individuals who maintain that the USPTO fee structure is not 
the cause of its problems, but instead its inefficient management of time, as well as its 
inability to manage the bulk of patent applications.
118
   
 USPTO should receive some control over the fee structure because it has the 
ability to use the surplus money to create more examiner positions for the review and 
evaluation of patent applications.  The major concerns over the USPTO’s efficiency and 
time management may be put to rest if the USPTO was able to train and/or hire more 
examiners for the future.  As David Kappos states, this reform makes certain “the USPTO 
gets the funding it desperately needs to operate efficiently and to protect the intellectual 
property rights of all innovators.”
119
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I. Educating Courts on Patent Law 
 Implementation of a trial program may be a minor issue compared to other major 
reformation topics discussed thus far, although it is not less significant.  Such a program 
could educate district courts across the country on patent litigation.  A.S. 515 establishes 
various pilot programs that will run for a duration of ten years in the courts with the 
greatest number of patent protection cases filed this past year.
120
  The USPTO is 
dedicated to spending money on this program to develop these courts, and the Director 
has stated that at least five million dollars will be spent on training the judges on major 
patent issues, as well as hiring law clerks with patent expertise.
121
   
 This program will serve as a major tool to help prepare district courts for intricate 
issues that may appear during patent litigation.
122
  Congress will have authority over the 
program during its implementation by being able to require trial courts to furnish detailed 
reports about each case.
123
  With this program, patent litigation could become more 
efficient and fair throughout the nation.  
IV. Conclusion 
 The Patent Reform Act of 2010 has the ability to majorly impact the United States 
patent realm, and it is an exciting time for those who interact with the patent system.  
Although this decade has faced a low passage rate of prior patent reform acts, it seems 
that the Patent Reform Act of 2010 has tried to maintain a balance between the 
proponents and opponents of patent reform.   
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The first-to-file system will unify the United States’ system with those of  the rest 
of the world, and will provide large companies with a strategic and innovative advantage 
in the market.  There are many changes to the damages provision that will reduce 
litigation in courts due to the higher burden placed upon parties.  Judicial efficiency is 
always a major concern for the courts, which is why the increased burden within the 
damages and false marking provisions greatly improves the chances for this patent reform 
bill to pass in Congress.  Furthermore, reexaminations and post-grant reviews will refine 
the patent system and its accuracy by providing in-depth examinations of patents that 
have already been filed. 
 Whether Congress concentrates on the major reforms such as first-to-file, or the 
minor ones such as the pilot program, each piece of the Patent Reform Act of 2010 plays 
an integral role in transforming U.S. patent law.  Though it seems that patent reform may 
not have made significant progress in recent history, the Patent Reform Act of 2010 can 
serve as the catalyst that takes the U.S. patent system to the next level.  Regardless of 
whether the Patent Reform Act of 2010 is passed by Congress this year, a major 
transformation appears to be in the near future. 
 
 
